




The unconventional nature of the September 11 terrorist attacks
represent to some observers a need to promote a fundamental and
paradigmatic shift in the application of international humanitarian law. The
classic international legal conventions regulating warfare were drafted when
war was fought primarily between nation-states. The prospect of terrorists
destroying skyscrapers or possibly wielding weapons of mass destruction was
not something delegates could have foreseen at the Hague and Geneva
Conventions. Arguments have therefore been presented since September 11
that non-state actors like al Qaeda whose terrorist actions closely resemble
armed conflict in scale and intensity, nevertheless could not have been
contemplated by the law of armed conflict, and that such actors do not deserve
the protection of this body of law. Other scholars have replied that this
position is a misconception of the law of armed conflict that could produce
untoward results for international law and the rule of law in general.
Consequently, it is precisely at the point of encounter-in this complex,
unfolding relationship between international humanitarian law, asymmetric
conflict, and the response of nation-states-that issues have been joined. The
United States insists simultaneously that while international humanitarian law
does not cover individuals whom it calls "unlawful combatants," such
individuals are subject to its sanctions. Rejecting this position, others argue
that neither terrorism nor terrorists deserve any recognition in international
law other than that reserved for criminals. And other scholars, concerned with
legal questions surrounding recent U.S. decisions to intervene in Afghanistan
and Iraq, wonder whether the increasingly unilateral U.S. approach to the use
of military force could have the unintended consequence of weakening the
law regulating war in future international conflicts.
The purpose of this symposium is to present elements of the debate as it
stands in academia and policy circles. The Legal Adviser of the U.S. State
Department stakes out one position in his essay, The Law of Armed Conflict
After 9/11: Some Salient Features. Proceeding from the twin premises that the
laws of war are humanitarian in nature and recent events do not necessitate
any change in the laws, William H. Taft, IV argues that it will disserve the law
of armed conflict for terrorists to be granted status as lawful belligerents. He
notes that terrorism violates international humanitarian law, but he argues that
the law of armed conflict should still govern the use of force in the war on
terrorism. Nevertheless, Taft contends that terrorism's illegality does not
preclude the application of the law of war where individuals or groups
conduct belligerent terrorist actions without the privilege of uniform. This
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principle informs the notion of "unlawful belligerents," and acknowledges that
"[t]errorism is [both a] negation of law . . . [and] of the fundamental
humanitarian principles of the law of armed conflict."
Professor Jordan Paust agrees with Taft that international humanitarian
law requires no significant change or revision. However, Paust's essay, War
and Enemy Status after 9/11.: Attacks on the Laws of War, takes this premise
in a different direction. He differs strongly over the implications of even
characterizing terrorist attacks like September 11 as creating a state of armed
conflict. First, according to his view, members of al Qaeda-presumed
perpetrators of various terrorist attacks on American, Kenyan, Tanzanian, and
other targets--do not fulfill the criteria set by international law for parties in
an armed conflict. Second, to Paust, to "expand the concept of war" is to
upend the law of armed conflict by legitimizing illegal acts with nomenclature
reserved only for recognized belligerents. He envisions a situation where
"non-state actor violence and targetings that otherwise remain criminal"
acquire a status that confers legitimacy in fact, if not in law. He concludes that
terrorist acts deserve no more than to be seen as criminal conduct-and
punished as such.
In Clouds on the Horizon of Humanitarian Law?, Professor Rudolf
Dolzer poses several questions on "the suitability and acceptance" of
international humanitarian law in the global antiterrorism campaign, where
nation-states might tailor their reactions to terrorism based on the nature of the
threat. He ponders whether the asymmetric nature of terrorism and possible
responses to it might undermine the existing "fragile" system of international
humanitarian law, because nation-states might feel compelled to abandon
values that presumably restrain a robust response to terrorism in its lack of
constraints. Dolzer identifies a possible linkage betweenjus ad bellum andjus
in bello, and he worries that the recent erosion in the U.N. Charter rules
regulating the use of force might produce similar deleterious effects on
international humanitarian law. He concludes with a proposal for creativity in
the antiterrorism campaign that matches diplomatic vigor with military might.
Finally, Professor Karl Meesen frames the debate within terms that flow
from the title of his essay, Unilateral Recourse to Military Force Against
Terrorist Attacks. Expounding on a concept of "society-induced terrorism"
that emphasizes the asymmetric nature of terrorist attacks, he places
antiterrorism measures within a context that acknowledges a nation's right of
self defense. Meessen articulates a theory predicting "an emerging rule of
customary law" that could confront terrorism. This law finds its roots in both
positive law and the imperatives of collective security. Within this framework,
Meessen argues that "unilateral recourse to military action is permitted if
effective multilateral action is unavailable." He concludes by advocating for
the eventual drafting of an international convention that restricts but does not
preclude the unilateral use of force against terrorist targets, but he recognizes
that the recent political and legal controversy surrounding the U.S.-led war
against Iraq may have "seriously prejudiced the chances" of agreeing on new
rules designed for the "fight against society-induced terrorism."
